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TORT INDEMNITY IN CALIFORNIA
John B. Molinari*
Indemnity is generally defined as the obligation resting on one
person to make good any loss or damage another has incurred.' The
right to indemnity and the obligation to indemnify include in-
demnity for another's negligence or tortious act. Until recently,
California recognized only the right to indemnity springing from
an express contract; but concomitant with the enactment of the
Contribution Statute of 19572 there has emerged in this state the
doctrine of implied indemnity arising from implied contract or upon
equitable considerations.' This doctrine has opened up new sources
of tort litigation and has already resulted in a substantial number of
appellate decisions expounding the nature of the right and its ap-
plication to given situations. It is also significant to note that since
the right to indemnity has been expanded to situations to which it
did not previously apply, attempts to counteract the application of
implied indemnity have also resulted in expanding the collateral
field of litigation dealing with provisions in express contracts pro-
viding for exculpation from and indemnity against tortious conduct.
It is the purpose of this article to deal generally with tort indemnity,
express and implied, but with particular emphasis on the develop-
ment of implied indemnity.
ExPREss INDEMNITY
The indemnity arising from express contract has been recog-
nized in California by statute since 1872,1 and by early5 as well as
recent decisions.6 Since parties may expressly contract with respect
* A.B. 1931, LL.B. 1933, University of San Francisco; LL.D. 1965, Lincoln
University. Presiding Justice, California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,
Division One.
1 44 C.J.S. Indemnity § 1 (1944); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 76-102
(1937).
2 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §§ 875-80 (West Supp. 1967).
a Peters v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 419, 431, 260 P.2d 55, 62
(1953) ; Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 376, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301,
305 (1962).
4 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2772 (West 1954).
5 Somers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 191 Cal. 542, 217 P. 746 (1923)
Showers v. Wadsworth, 81 Cal. 270, 22 P. 663 (1889) ; Commercial Union Assurance
Co. v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 68 Cal. 430, 9 P. 712 (1886); Alberts v. American
Cas. Co., 88 Cal. App. 2d 891, 200 P.2d 37 (1948); Davis v. California Highway
Indem. Exch., 118 Cal. App. 403, 5 P.2d 447 (1931).
6 Markley v. Beagle, 66 Cal. 2d 951, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809, 429 P.2d 129 (1967);
John E. Branagh & Sons v. Witcosky, 242 Cal. App. 2d 835, 51 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1966).
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to indemnity, the extent of their obligation is determined from the
contract according to the rules governing the requisites and validity
of contracts and not by reference to the independent doctrine of
implied or equitable indemnity.7 Accordingly, the promise made in
an indemnity contract is an original and not a collateral under-
taking, and the liability assumed is a primary one.8
IMPLIED INDEMNITY
Although the parties do not expressly contract with respect to
indemnity, the right of indemnification may nevertheless arise by
implication as a matter of law either as a result of contract or as a
result of equitable considerations.' Such indemnity is referred to as
implied indemnity or as equitable indemnity. The development of
the doctrine of implied indemnity in tort and its application to
factual situations will be discussed later in this article, but it should
be here noted that the cases will disclose that implied indemnity
partakes of two types, contractual and non-contractual. The former
rests upon a contractual relationship between the person seeking and
the one resisting indemnity; the latter rests upon the fault of
another which has been imputed to or constructively fastened upon
the person who seeks indemnity without regard to any contractual
relationship.' 0
RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION DISTINGUISHED
A proper understanding of the nature and application of the
right of indemnity requires a conversance with the right of contribu-
tion. The right of contribution among tortfeasors, where it exists,
presupposes that the parties are equal in legal fault, i.e., in pari
delicto, and that the common liability is shared by them on a pro
rata basis." Indemnity, on the other hand, imposes the entire loss on
7 Markley v. Beagle, 66 Cal. 2d 951, 961, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809, 816, 429 P.2d 129,
136 (1967) ; County of Los Angeles v. Cox Bros. Constr. Co., 195 Cal. App. 2d 836,
842, 16 Cal. Rptr. 250, 253 (1961). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 2772 (West 1954).
8 See 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 1 (1944).
9 City & County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 130, 330 P.2d 802,
803 (1958) ; Peters v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 419, 431, 260 P.2d
55, 62 (1953); Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 376, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 301, 305 (1962) ; Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 76,
4 Cal. Rptr. 379, 384 (1960).
10 See Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 376, 378-79, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 301, 305, 307-08 (1962).
11 Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (1964);
Mundt v. Alta Bates Hosp., 223 Cal. App. 2d 413, 417, 35 Cal. Rptr. 848, 850 (1963) ;
American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d 520, 524-26,
21 Cal. Rptr. 33, 35-36 (1962); Apodacca v. Hamilton, 189 Cal. App. 2d 78, 82, 10
Cal. Rptr. 885, 888 (1961) ; Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 75,
4 Cal. Rptr. 379, 383 (1960).
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the party found to be primarily liable. 2 In noting the distinction
between contribution and indemnity we observe that in California
the former is mainly a creature of statute while the latter is essen-
tially the progeny of judicial decisions.
In 1957 the California Legislature enacted the Contribution
Statute13 providing for the right of contribution, but made it de-
pendent upon the presence of specific statutory conditions. 1" Where
these specific conditions do not exist, the common law rule still
prevails that there is no contribution between persons jointly or
severally liable in tort.'5 It should be here pointed out that the
Contribution Statute expressly takes cognizance of the existence of
the right of indemnity in tort by its provisions that "[t] his title shall
not impair any right of indemnity under existing law, and where one
tortfeasor judgment debtor is entitled to indemnity from another
there shall be no right of contribution between them."'"
In the light of the foregoing distinctions the onus is placed on
the trial judge to determine in a given case whether the case is one of
indemnity or contribution since the conduct of the trial will depend
on the nature of the right. Thus, in a contribution case evidence of
the amount received in settlement from a joint tortfeasor is admis-
sible to prove an elimination of a portion of the damages claimed by
the plaintiff and the jury shall be instructed that the amount of
settlement should be deducted from the total amount of the damage
found to have been sustained by the plaintiff.' 7 Accordingly, the de-
termination, in each instance, depends upon the facts of the par-
ticular case.' 8
EMERGENCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED INDEMNITY
In 1953 the California Supreme Court had before it, in Peters
v. City & County of San Francisco,9 a case involving an action
12 Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (1964);
Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 75, 4 Cal. Rptr. 379, 383
(1960).
13 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 875-80 (West Supp. 1967).
14 See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 875-77 (West Supp. 1967).
15 Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Consani, 223 Cal. App. 2d 342, 344, 35 Cal. Rptr. 750,
751 (1963); American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d
520, 523, 21 Cal. Rptr. 33, 34 (1962).
16 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 375(f) (West Supp. 1967) ; see County of Los Angeles
v. Cox Bros. Constr. Co., 195 Cal. App. 2d 836, 842, 16 Cal. Rptr. 250, 253-54 (1961).
17 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §§ 877 (West Supp. 1967); Turner v. Mannon, 236 Cal.
App. 2d 134, 139, 45 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835 (1965) ; Cseri v. D'Amore, 232 Cal. App. 2d
622, 625, 43 Cal. Rptr. 36, 38-39 (1965); Watson v. McEwen, 225 Cal. App. 2d 771,
775, 37 Cal. Rptr. 677, 680 (1964); Steele v. Hash, 212 Cal. App. 2d 1, 3, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 853, 854 (1963).
18 Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (1964).
19 41 Cal. 2d 419, 260 P.2d 55 (1953).
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against the city and the owners of an apartment house for damages
for injuries to a pedestrian as a result of a fall on the sidewalk in
front of the apartment house. While the right of indemnity was not
directly involved, it was suggested in Peters that a right of indem-
nification as between joint tortfeasors may arise as a result of con-
tract or equitable considerations and as an exception to the rule
against contribution between joint tortfeasors.2 ° The first clear rec-
ognition, however, came in San Francisco Unified School District v.
California Building Maintenance Co.2 decided in July 1958. In that
case it was held that a prima facie case for indemnity had been made
by the school district plaintiff against the defendant maintenance
company for damages that the district was compelled to pay to an
employee of the maintenance company who had been injured while
washing the windows of a high school. The company had agreed to
wash the windows from the inside with stepladders but failed to
furnish such ladders to its employees. The court held that the con-
tract was breached, and that the damages flowing to the district from
such breach were subject to indemnification under an agreement
necessarily implied in the contract.
The San Francisco Unified School District case relied upon the
rationale in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.22
and Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co.
23
where it was held that a shipowner could claim indemnity against
a stevedoring company whose employee had recovered a judgment
against the shipowner for injuries sustained in the course of his
employment connected with the unsafe manner in which cargo was
unloaded from a vessel. Liability was there predicated upon the
breach of the stevedoring contract, notwithstanding the absence of
an express agreement of indemnity, the rationale being that such
contract necessarily implied an obligation to perform the stevedoring
services contracted for with reasonable safety, and to discharge
foreseeable damages resulting to the shipowner from the contractor's
improper performance and not flowing from the shipowner's negli-
gence.
A few months later, in October 1958, the California Supreme
Court decided City & County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 4 the
first non-contractual implied indemnity case. In that case it was held
that a city had the right to recover by way of indemnity the amount
of damages it was compelled to pay a member of the public injured
20 Id. at 430-31, 260 P.2d at 62.
21 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958).
22 350 U.S. 124, 133 (1955).
23 355 U.S. 563, 569 (1958).
24 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958).
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by an artificial structure placed on the sidewalk by an abutting
landowner for the exclusive benefit of his own property. The review-
ing court, although noting that other jurisdictions drew a distinction
between "active" and "passive" negligence in holding that a munici-
pality is entitled to indemnity from the landowner in such a
situation, preferred to predicate liability upon the equitable con-
siderations of a "primary" duty on the part of the landowner and a
"secondary" duty on the part of the municipality arising out of the
special relationship existing between them. The rationale of Ho
Sing is that the city's duty was secondary to that of the landowner in
that the city was liable solely because it failed or neglected to keep
the sidewalk safe, while the landowner was primarily liable because
it was his wrongful act or conduct that rendered the sidewalk
unsafe.25
The first case to come to grips with the question of primary and
secondary liability in a tort action not involving a special relation-
ship as exists in the case of a municipality and an abutting land-
owner is American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco26
decided in April 1962. There the vehicle owned by the plaintiff, who
was seeking indemnity, struck the defendant's improperly parked
truck injuring two of the latter's employees who were on the truck
and who thereafter had recovered damages from the plaintiff. The
appellate court held that the complaint did not state a cause of
action for indemnity because under the facts pleaded it appeared
that the plaintiff was actively negligent and, therefore, primarily
liable, notwithstanding the defendant may have been more negligent.
The American Can case, recognizing that the distinction between
"active" and "passive" negligence is not of itself a sufficient basis
for an implied duty to indemnify, adopted, as the better rule, the
rule of primary and secondary liability announced in Builders
Supply Co. v. McCabe,27 and the rationale supporting it, as follows:
The right of indemnity rests upon a difference between the primary and
secondary liability of two persons each of whom is made responsible by
the law to an injured party. It is a right which enures to a person who,
without active fault on his part, has been compelled by reason of some
legal obligation, to pay damages occasioned by the initial negligence of
another, and for which he himself is only secondarily liable. The differ-
ence between primary and secondary liability is not based on a difference
in degrees of negligence or on any doctrine of comparative negligence-
a doctrine which, indeed, is not recognized by the common law; . . . It
depends on a difference in the character or kind of the wrongs which
cause the injury and in the nature of the legal obligation owed by each
25 Id. at 133-34, 330 P.2d at 805-06.
20 202 Cal. App. 2d 520, 21 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1962).
27 366 Pa. 322, 325-26, 77 A.2d 368, 370-71 (1951).
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of the wrongdoers to the injured person. . . . But the important point
to be noted in all the cases is that secondary as distinguished from
primary liability rests upon a fault that is imputed or constructive only,
being based on some legal relation between the parties, or arising from
some positive rule of common or statutory law or because of a failure
to discover or correct a defect or remedy a dangerous condition caused
by the act of the one primarily responsible.
28
The foregoing decisions, and others, were analyzed, discussed,
distinguished and reconciled in Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co.29
decided in October 1962. Cahill pointed out the significance of the
distinction between contractual and non-contractual implied indem-
nity and noted that in the former the courts are not concerned with
the incidents of primary and secondary liability but rather with the
question as to whether the defendant has breached a contractual
duty owing to the plaintiff seeking indemnity. In each instance,
however, the crux of the inquiry is whether the person seeking in-
demnity participated in some manner in the conduct or omission
that caused the injury beyond the mere failure to perform the duty
imposed on him by law." Accordingly, if the person seeking in-
demnity personally participates in an affirmative act of negligence,
or is physically connected with an act or omission by knowledge or
acquiescence in it on his part, or if he fails to perform some duty in
connection with the omission which he may have undertaken by
agreement, he is deprived of the right of indemnity.2
CONTRACTUAL IMPLIED INDEMNITY
As pointed out in Cahill, contractual implied indemnity rests
upon a contractual relationship between the person seeking and the
one resisting indemnity and is based upon the breach of the contract
by the person against whom indemnity is sought. Thus implicit in a
written agreement to perform services is the implied duty to perform
the work in a safe manner and to discharge foreseeable damages
from negligent performance." Accordingly, the right of contractual
28 American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d 520,
525, 21 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (1962).
29 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1962).
30 Id. at 379-80, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
31 Id. at 381, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
32 Id. at 382, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
33 Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 569 (1958);
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 133 (1955); Cahill
Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 376, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301, 305 (1962);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. KPIX Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d
759, 761-62, 18 Cal. Rptr. 341, 342-43 (1962) ; De La Forest v. Yandle, 171 Cal. App.
2d 59, 61, 340 P.2d 52, 53-54 (1959) ; San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California
Bldg. Maintenance Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 447, 328 P.2d 785, 793 (1958).
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implied indemnity has been found to exist in a variety of situations
where implicit in the contract to perform work is the duty to perform
it in a skillful, expert or careful manner."
NON-CONTRACTUAL IMPLIED INDEMNITY
Non-contractual implied indemnity arises where the person who
seeks indemnity is required to rely upon equitable considerations
because he cannot predicate his right upon a contractual relation-
ship between him and the one resisting indemnity. In California, as
indicated by the rationale and trend of the decisions, these equitable
considerations are those which recognize the difference between
primary and secondary liability. These cases recognize the right of a
claimant to shift the entire loss to another where the claimant who is
without active fault or negligence on his part is compelled by reason
of some legal obligation to pay damages occasioned by the negli-
gence of the other."5
The case of Herrero v. Atkinson36 presents an interesting
example of the operation on non-contractual implied indemnity.
There the plaintiff was allowed indemnity against certain doctors
whose malpractice resulted in the death of a woman in the treatment
of injuries resulting from the plaintiff's operation of his motor
vehicle. The holding in Herrero was predicated upon the basis that,
since the plaintiff had no part in the selection of the doctors and no
control or direction over their conduct, he was entitled to recover the
portion of the damages caused by the doctors' negligence even
though, as to the heirs of the decedent, plaintiff was liable for all of
the damages because his original negligence was the proximate cause
of the subsequent malpractice. 7
34 Ferrel v. Vegetable Oil Prods. Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 117, 55 Cal. Rptr. 589
(1966); Vegetable Oil Prods. Co. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 252, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 555 (1963) (both the foregoing cases involving claim of property owner against
employer whose employee sued owner for injuries sustained on owner's premises
resulting from employer's failure to provide for employee's safety) ; Great Western
Furniture Co. v. Porter Corp., 238 Cal. App. 2d 502, 48 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1965) (assault
by employee of one corporation but under exclusive control of another corporation) ;
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. KPIX Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d
759, 18 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1962) (telecast) ; Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal.
App. 2d 69, 4 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1960) (engineering work); De La Forest v. Yandle, 171
Cal. App. 2d 59, 340 P.2d 52 (1950) (axle repair).
35 City & County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 138, 330 P.2d 802,
808 (1958) ; Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. D. Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal. App. 2d 604, 607, 57
Cal. Rptr. 701, 703 (1967) ; Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367,
378-79, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301, 307 (1962) ; Pierce v. Turner, 205 Cal. App. 2d 264, 267-68,
23 Cal. Rptr. 115, 117-18 (1962) ; American Can Co. v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d 520, 525, 21 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (1962) ; Builders Supply Co. v.
McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 325-26, 77 A.2d 368, 370-71 (1951).
86 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964).
37 Id. See also Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. D. Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal. App. 2d 604,
57 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1967).
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Until the recent case of City of Sausalito v. Ryan8 two pre-
requisites were necessary for the operation of the doctrine of non-
contractual implied indemnity in California. These were: (1) that
the damages which the claimant sought to shift were imposed upon
him initially as the result of some legal obligation to the injured
party; and (2) that the claimant did not actively or affirmatively
participate in the wrong.
The City of Sausalito case appears to enlarge upon the rule as
declared by the cases which preceded it. There a passenger in a motor
vehicle was drowned in San Francisco Bay following a collision
between that vehicle and another vehicle. A wrongful death action
was brought against the drivers of the two vehicles based upon the
intoxication of the host driver and the negligence of the other, and
against the city for negligence in violation of a statute in maintaining
a dangerous road without a barrier between it and the bay.3 9 The
appellate court held that the city could cross-complain against the
two individual defendants for indemnity in the event that it was
found liable to the plaintiff. The rationale of the court's holding was
that the right of indemnity can be predicated upon breaches of
different qualities of duties and, accordingly, upon different planes of
fault.
The court in City of Sausalito relied upon the rationale of
United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener,4" where the federal appellate court
expanded upon the theoretical basis of the doctrine of non-con-
tractual implied indemnity in holding that its doctrinal basis is
unjust enrichment. The court there took cognizance of the situations
in which indemnity is permitted where the indemnitee is not actively
negligent, but rejected the concepts of primary and secondary lia-
bility and held that one tortfeasor, although actively negligent, may
recover damages by way of indemnity against another where there
is a disparity of the gravity of fault or a difference in the contrasted
character of the established fault. The court's rationale was that
"where the offense is merely malum prohibitum, and is in no respect
immoral, it is not against the policy of the law to inquire into the
relative delinquency of the parties, and to administer justice between
them, although both parties are wrongdoers.""'
A hearing has been granted in the City of Sausalito case by the
California Supreme Court and it remains to be seen whether the
rationale of that case will be upheld. It would appear that the
38 258 A.C.A. 92, 65 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1968).
39 CAL. Gov. CODE § 835 (West Supp. 1967).
40 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964).
41 Id. at 398-99.
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appellate court was on firm ground when it held that the absence of
a special relationship between the drivers of the two cars and the
city did not prevent the application of the doctrine of equitable
indemnity since it is clear that the right can be invoked even in the
absence of a special relationship between the tortfeasors.42 The
thrust of the decision appears to be, however, that in California,
indemnity may be predicated upon the basis of the disparity in the
contrasted gravity of fault. Such a rule is clearly an expansion of the
doctrine of implied indemnity as heretofore recognized by the Cali-
fornia cases. In light of the principles hereinafter discussed with
respect to the claimant's fault, those cases would appear to hold that
the crux of the inquiry is whether under the circumstances the city
participated in the conduct or omission which caused the injury
beyond the mere failure to perform the duty imposed upon it by law.
It seems that in California there is no room for a contrast between
the different planes of fault because if there is such participation
then the claimant's fault suffices to preclude indemnity; if there is
no such participation there is no fault and indemnity is permitted.
It should be pointed out here that there is no right of indemnity
if the party seeking and the party resisting indemnity are both
secondarily liable. Thus in Horn & Barker, Inc. v. Macco Corp."5
the plaintiff was denied recovery by way of indemnity from the de-
fendant where a workman, who was the general employee of the
plaintiff and the special employee of the defendant, was negligent in
the operation of a machine leased by the plaintiff to the defendant.
The basis of the decision was that both employers were secondarily
liable since there was "only one character or kind of wrong in issue,
i.e., the imputed liability resulting from the application of the
doctrine of respondeat superior."44
CLAIMANT AT FAULT
Whether a claimant can sustain a right of indemnity premised
upon implied contractual or equitable indemnity, depends upon
whether he has participated in some manner in the conduct or omis-
sion which caused the injury beyond the mere failure to perform
the duty imposed upon him by law.45 Accordingly, in each instance
42 See Cobb v. Southern Pac. Co., 251 A.C.A. 1073, 1077, 59 Cal. Rptr. 916, 918
(1967); Lewis Ave. Parent Teachers' Assn. v. Hussey, 250 A.C.A. 297, 300, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 499, 501-02 (1967) ; Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr.
490, 493 (1964).
43 228 Cal. App. 2d 96, 39 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1964).
44 Id. at 101, 102-06, 39 Cal. Rptr. 323-26. See also Progressive Transp. Co. v.
Southern California Gas Co., 241 Cal. App. 2d 738, 51 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1966).
45 Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 381, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301,
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the important determination (which is not always an easy one) is
whether the claimant's participation went beyond non-action and the
mere failure to perform a duty imposed by law.
In striving for a practical and workable rule to assist in deter-
mining whether the claimant's participation precludes recovery, the
California courts have formulated the rule "that if the person seek-
ing indemnity personally participates in an affirmative act of negli-
gence, or is physically connected with an act or omission by knowl-
edge or acquiescence in it on his part, or fails to perform some duty
in connection with the omission which he may have undertaken by
virtue of his agreement," he cannot obtain indemnification.40 In
some cases this principle is succinctly stated in terms of nonrecovery
where there is "active fault" on the claimant's part,4 7 in others in
terms of "active" and "passive" negligence, recovery being denied
where the claimant is "actively negligent" or "affirmatively negli-
gent." Thus, a claimant has been deprived of the right of in-
demnity in the following situations: where he was concurrently
negligent in the operation of a truck which collided with another
vehicle;4" where he failed to supervise the negligent tree-cutting
operation by an employee;" and where the plaintiff's superintendent
who acted as defendant's manager took part in the construction of a
defective barricade by the defendant.51 On the other hand, the right
of indemnity was held to exist in favor of a general contractor
against a subcontractor who failed to take precautionary measures
for which the general contractor was also made responsible by opera-
309 (1962); Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 79, 4 Cal. Rptr.
379, 385-86 (1960); San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Mainte-
nance Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 445, 328 P.2d 785, 792 (1958).
40 Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 40, 44, 396 P.2d 377,
379, 41 Cal. Rptr. 73, 75 (1964); Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., 54
Cal. 2d 445, 449, 353 P.2d 924, 927, 6 Cal. Rptr. 284, 287 (1960) ; Aerojet Gen. Corp.
v. D. Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal. App. 2d 604, 608, 57 Cal. Rptr. 701, 703-04 (1967) ;
Progressive Transp. Co. v. Southern California Gas Co., 241 Cal. App. 2d 738, 741, 51
Cal. Rptr. 116, 118-19 (1966); Kwikset Locks v. Steward Commissaries, 225 Cal.
App. 2d 146, 151, 37 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251 (1964) ; Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208
Cal. App. 2d 367, 382, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301, 309 (1962) ; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 202 Cal. App. 2d 99, 111-13, 20 Cal. Rptr. 820, 826-27
(1962).
47 Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. D. Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal. App. 2d 604, 607, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 701, 703 (1967); American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 202
Cal. App. 2d 520, 525, 21 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (1962).
48 King v. Timber Structures, Inc., 240 Cal. App. 2d 178, 182, 49 Cal. Rptr. 414,
417 (1966); Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 382, 25 Cal. Rptr.
301, 309 (1962).
49 American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d 520,
21 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1962).
50 Pierce v. Turner, 205 Cal. App. 2d 264, 23 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1962).




tion of law,52 and in favor of the owner of property where an inde-
pendent contractor's employee was injured while performing duties
in connection with a repair contract between the owner and the con-
tractor and where the owner assumed no affirmative duties with
respect to the work.53
LABOR CODE SECTION 3864
As a result of the holding in the San Francisco Unified School
District case, a third person who had been held liable for damages
for injuries sustained by an employee of another could, where the
doctrine of implied indemnity was applicable, seek indemnification
against the employee's own employer where the latter's negligence
proximately contributed to the injury. Accordingly, the effect of the
doctrine in this situation was to make the employer not only liable
for the injured employee's workmen's compensation, but for the
additional damages awarded to him in common law as well. 4 To
obviate this situation the legislature in 1959 enacted Labor Code
section 3864," the effect of which was to abolish the right of in-
demnity by the third person against the injured employee's employer
on the theory of implied contract.56 The 1959 statute does not, how-
ever, apply retroactively.5 7
WITT V. JACKSON
Although under Labor Code section 3864 a third person cannot
invoke implied indemnity against an injured employee's employer,
52 Baldwin Contracting Co. v. Winston Steel Works, 236 Cal. App. 2d 565, 46
Cal. Rptr. 421 (1965).
53 Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. D. Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal. App. 2d 604, 57 Cal. Rptr.
701 (1967) ; Ferrell v. Vegetable Oil Prods. Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 117, 55 Cal. Rptr.
589 (1966).
54 City of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. App. 2d 398, 404-05, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 43, 47 (1962); see Conley & Sayre, Rights of Indemnity As They Affect Lia-
bility Insurance, 13 HAsTINcs L.J. 214, 219 (1961).
55 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3864 (West Supp. 1967) provides: "If an action as pro-
vided in this chapter prosecuted by the employee, the employer, or both jointly
against the third person results in judgment against such third person, or settlement
by such third person, the employer shall have no liability to reimburse or hold harm-
less on such judgment or settlement in the absence of a written agreement to do so
executed prior to the injury."
56 San Francisco Examiner Div. v. Sweat, 248 Cal. App. 2d 493, 496-97, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 711, 713-14 (1967); Progressive Transp. Co. v. Southern California Gas Co.,
241 Cal. App. 2d 738, 742, 51 Cal. Rptr. 116, 119 (1966); Western Gulf Oil Co.
v. Oilwell Serv. Co., 219 Cal. App. 2d 235, 241, 33 Cal. Rptr. 20, 24 (1963) ; City of
Sacramento v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. App. 2d 398, 405, 23 Cal. Rptr. 43, 47 (1962) ;
American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d 520, 524, 21
Cal. Rptr. 33, 35 (1962).
57 Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. D. Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal. App. 2d 604, 608, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 701, 704 (1967).
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the third party tortfeasor may invoke the concurrent negligence of
the employer for the purpose of reducing any judgment awarded the
injured employee by the amount of workmen's compensation bene-
fits paid under the rule of Witt v. Jackson.8 "That rule provides
that a third party tortfeasor may invoke the concurrent negligence
of the employer to defeat the latter's right to reimbursement for
workmen's compensation benefits paid to an employee proximately
injured as a result of the negligence of such third party, whether an
action against said third party is brought by an employer who has
already paid workmen's compensation or by the employee who has
received compensation."5
HOLD HARMLESS CLAUSES
As already pointed out, parties may expressly contract with
respect to indemnity. An indemnification agreement is one in which
the indemnitor agrees to indemnify the indemnitee if and when a
claim is asserted against the latter. Another device, frequently used
in contractual dealings, to limit one's liability is the exculpatory
clause. The party relying on an exculpatory provision generally seeks
to avoid liability for his own negligence. ° Since an exculpatory pro-
vision will be upheld only if it does not affect the "public interest"'"
it is important to distingush it from a situation where indemnifica-
tion is contemplated.
One may provide for exculpation from or indemnification
against his own negligence provided the agreement is clear and
explicit.62 Although it has been held that such agreements are strictly
construed against the party seeking exculpation or the indemnitee,6"
58 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961). See also Benwell v.
Dean, 249 Cal. App. 2d 345, 357-62, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 403-06 (1967); City of
Sacramento v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. App. 2d 398, 405, 23 Cal. Rptr. 43, 47 (1962).
59 Benwell v. Dean, 249 Cal. App. 2d 345, 358, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 403 (1967).
See also Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).
60 John E. Branagh & Sons v. Witcosky, 242 Cal. App. 2d 835, 838, 51 Cal. Rptr.
844, 846 (1966). See also CAL. CIv. Cona § 1668 (West 1954); Goldman v. Ecco-
Phoenix Elec. Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 40, 48-49, 396 P.2d 377, 382, 41 Cal. Rptr. 73, 78
(1964).
61 Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 40, 48-49, 396 P.2d 377, 382,
41 Cal. Rptr. 73, 78 (1964); John E. Branagh & Sons v. Witcosky, 242 Cal. App. 2d
835, 838-39, 51 Cal. Rptr. 844, 846 (1966); see Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cali-
fornia, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (defining "public interest").
62 Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 40, 44, 396 P.2d 377, 379,
41 Cal. Rptr. 73, 75 (1964) ; Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d
445, 353 P.2d 924, 6 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1960) ; Vinnel Co. v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 52 Cal.
2d 411, 415, 340 P.2d 604, 607 (1959); John E. Branagh & Sons v. Witcosky, 242
Cal. App. 2d 835, 839, 51 Cal. Rptr. 844, 847 (1966); King v. Timber Structures,
Inc., 240 Cal. App. 2d 178, 181, 49 Cal. Rptr. 414, 417 (1966).
63 Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 40, 44, 396 P.2d 377, 379,
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this rule has certain limitations. Thus, in interpreting a hold harm-
less clause phrased in general terms the courts in California look to
the nature of the negligence or misconduct in determining whether
the clause provides exculpation or indemnity.64 If the breach of
conduct is active or affirmative the indemnity or exculpatory clause
will not be upheld.65 Accordingly, the indemnity or exculpatory
clause must clearly express that it affords protection against affirma-
tive acts of negligence.6" On the other hand, where the breach of
duty amounts to no more than passive negligence or nonfeasance
such as a negligent failure to discover a dangerous condition, a gen-
eral clause will suffice.67
CONCLUSION
In the light of the foregoing it is clear that in California in-
demnity may arise from an express contract, an implied contract, or
as a result of equitable considerations. A party may expressly con-
tract with respect to indemnity by providing for exculpation from or
indemnification against his own negligence provided the agreement is
clear and explicit, and provided further, that an agreement which
is purely exculpatory is not against the public interest. Where the
exculpatory or indemnification clause is phrased in general terms it
will be interpreted not to avoid liability if the breach of conduct
is active or affirmative; but where conduct is passive or amounts to
no more than nonfeasance, the general clause will be upheld.
The right of indemnification may also arise by implication as a
matter of law either as a result of contract or equitable considera-
tions. Contractual implied indemnity regts upon a contractual rela-
tionship between the person seeking and the person resisting
41 Cal. Rptr. 73, 75 (1964); Pacific Indem. Co. v. California Elec. Works, 29 Cal.
App. 2d 260, 271, 84 P.2d 313, 319 (1938).
64 Markley v. Beagle, 66 Cal. 2d 951, 962, 429 P.2d 129, 136, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809,
816 (1967); Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 445, 448-49,
353 P.2d 924, 927, 6 Cal. Rptr. 284, 287 (1960); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Massachu-
setts Bonding & Ins. Co., 202 Cal. App. 2d 99, 111-13, 20 Cal. Rptr. 820, 826-27 (1962).
65 Markley v. Beagle, 66 Cal. 2d 951, 962, 429 P.2d 129, 136, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809,
816 (1967); Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 40, 44-45, 396 P.2d
377, 379, 41 Cal. Rptr. 73, 75 (1964) ; Vinnel Co. v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 52 Cal. 2d 411,
415, 340 P.2d 604, 607 (1959) ; King v. Timber Structures, Inc., 240 Cal. App. 2d
178, 181-82, 49 Cal. Rptr. 414, 417 (1966).
66 Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 445, 353 P.2d 924,
926-27, 6 Cal. Rptr. 284, 286-87 (1960); King v. Timber Structures, Inc., 240 Cal.
App. 2d 178, 181-82, 49 Cal. Rptr. 414, 417 (1966); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 202 Cal. App. 2d 99, 111-13, 20 Cal. Rptr. 820, 826-27
(1962).
67 Markley v. Beagle, 66 Cal. 2d 951, 962, 429 P.2d 129, 136, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809,
816 (1967); Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 445, 448-49,
353 P.2d 924, 926-27, 6 Cal. Rptr. 284, 286-87 (1960).
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indemnity and is based upon the breach of an agreement to in-
demnify necessarily implied in the contract. Non-contractual
implied indemnity, on the other hand, depends upon equitable con-
siderations and upon the difference between primary and secondary
liability. Unless the City of Sausalito case represents the future law,
there is no right of implied indemnity in California if the person
seeking indemnity has participated in some manner in the conduct
or omission which caused the injury beyond the mere failure to
perform the duty which the law imposed on the claimant. By "par-
ticipation" is meant active negligence or personal participation in an
affirmative act of negligence, or physical connection with an act or
omission by knowledge or acquiescence, or the failure to perform
some duty in connection with the omission which the claimant may
have undertaken by virtue of his agreement.
